This paper investigates unique implementation in large economies with incomplete information and interdependent values; we degenerate the common knowledge assumptions and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment. With a minor restriction on the class of environments, we demonstrate that there exists a detail-free mechanism that virtually implements competitive allocations with complete information in twice iterative dominance, irrespective of how the environment is specified.
Introduction
This paper investigates the unique implementation problem in economic environments with incomplete information and interdependent values, wherein a sufficiently large number of players exist with single-unit supplies and demands. Each player receives her respective private signals that are correlated with each other through some unobservable macro shock. Each player's value for the commodity depends not only on her private signal but also on this macro shock, which implies interdependent values. The central planner attempts to design a well-behaved mechanism in that, irrespective of the macro shock that occurs, every strategy profile that satisfies a defined equilibrium concept can induce a competitive allocation with complete information at least approximately and almost certainly.
The standard approach in the implementation literature with incomplete information has assumed that the central planner has complete knowledge of the specifications of the environments, such as the payoff and signal structures, and tailors a mechanism for the finer details of these specifications. See Jackson (1991) , Palfrey (1992) , Matsushima (1990 Matsushima ( , 1993 , Matsushima (1992, 1994) , and Maskin and Sjöström (2002) . Equilibrium concepts such as the Nash equilibrium and iterative dominance have generally been used; these concepts rely on the strong rationality assumption that it is not only mutual knowledge but also common knowledge for the players to avoid playing dominated strategies. These assumptions are regarded as the drawbacks of the standard implementation problem and have been criticized from the practical and experimental viewpoints. In fact, many authors studying auction design from the practical standpoint have confined their attention to auction protocols that are detail-free, i.e., independent of the finer details of the specifications. See Krishna (2002) , Milgrom (2004), and Klemperer (2004) . Several experimental studies have reported that subjects in laboratory experiments like guessing games made a maximum of two or three iterative removals of dominated strategies. For instance, see Camerer (2003, Chapter 5) .
Based on the above viewpoints, this paper considers the situation in which the central planner is unaware of the specifications of the environment. From the practical viewpoint, we consider the central planner who, instead of tailoring a mechanism based on the specifications, attempts to design a detail-free mechanism that implements the desired allocations irrespective of how the environment is specified.
1 Further, based on the experimental viewpoint, we use the equilibrium concept of twice iterative dominance, which requires players to eliminate dominated strategies only two times iteratively. Twice iterative dominance is based solely on the weak rationality assumption that it is not common but mutual knowledge among the players that they do not play dominated strategies. The main theorem of this paper is permissive, which reveals that with a minor restriction on the class of possible environments, there exists a detail-free mechanism that can virtually implement competitive allocations with complete information in twice iterative dominance, irrespective of how the environment is specified.
The constructed mechanism describes the following three-stage procedure. The central planner divides the players into a sufficient number of distinct groups, each of which includes an adequate number of sellers and buyers. The central planner then requires each player to announce three price bids as follows. In stage 1, each player announces the first bid. After the first bid announcement, she observes the first bid announcements in the preceding group. In stage 2, she announces the second bid. After the second bid announcement, she observes the first bid announcements in all groups other than her own.
5
Finally, in stage 3, she announces the third bid.
In order to determine the allocation, the central planner randomly uses two rules: the random fixed price rule and the price-taking rule. With a positive but very low probability, the central planner uses the random fixed price rule, according to which she selects a trading price randomly and independent of the players' announcements. With a very high probability, the central planner uses the price-taking rule instead of the random fixed price rule. The central planner balances the transfers within each group.
For each group, she calculates the market-clearing price that equalizes the supplies and demands associated with the second bids within that group. In order to conduct the transfers within each group, the central planner sets the trading price for this group such that it is equal to the market-clearing price for its preceding group and accords the priority to players whose third bids are greater than this price. Since the trading price for each group is determined independent of the announcements in this group, and the signals possessed by the other players in this group are relatively uninformative with respect to all the signals possessed by the players in the other groups, it follows that all players in this group are willing to adopt price-taking behaviors in the virtual sense for their third bid announcements. Hence, they have the incentive to almost honestly announce their conditional expected values that approximate their true values.
The standard analysis of competitive markets with interdependent values has assumed the form of a non-strategic price taker and investigated a rational expectation equilibrium;
for instance, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, Chapter 19) . Each trader updates her belief based on the market price and the forecast function that maps private signal profiles to trading prices, and then maximizes the updated expected utility as a non-strategic price taker. In order to demonstrate a strategic foundation for a rational expectation equilibrium, Reny and Perry (2006) investigated the standard model of a large double auction and established the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that resembles the rational expectation equilibrium. Also, see McLean, Peck, and Postlewaite (2005) .
These studies have not considered the issue of uniqueness, which is the central theme of the implementation theory. Moreover, since the trading price for each player is determined independent of her price bids, we do not require any price grid device to restrict the players' price manipulations as employed by Reny and Perry (2006) .
In the implementation literature, Matsushima (2006a) investigated the possibility that a detail-free mechanism implements social choice functions in general environments. Matsushima (2006a) assumed that each player has an intrinsic preference for honest
reporting. This paper focuses on players who are motivated only by their material interests.
Another paper by Matsushima (2006b) investigated implementation possibilities of efficient allocations on the assumption that players can conduct a maximum of three iterative removals of dominated strategies. Matsushima (2006b) used mechanisms that are not detail-free and therefore depend on the finer details of the specifications. Morris (2005a, 2005b ) studied the robustness of mechanism design on the assumption that the environment is not common knowledge among the players and the central planner. In contrast, the present paper permits the common knowledge assumption among the players with respect to the environment and focuses on the case in which the central planner is unaware of the environment specifications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents definitions and notations. Section 3 demonstrates the main theorem. Section 4 presents a brief sketch of the proof of the main theorem. Section 5 presents the full proof.
The Model
Let n and r denote two positive integers. Let {1,..., } { 1,..., 2 } N nr nr nr = + ∪ denote the set of players, where the first nr players are regarded as the sellers and the last nr players are regarded as the buyers. We assume that both n and r are sufficiently large. Each seller possesses one unit of the commodity, and therefore, the total amount of the commodity equals nr . Let 
The Theorem
Fix an infinite sequence (i) Suppose
(ii) Suppose
denotes the probability of
The left-hand side of inequalities (1) and (4) represents the probability of player i consuming one unit of the commodity at the macro shock 0 ω . Inequality (1) implies that any player i N ∈ almost certainly consumes the commodity if
Inequality (4) implies that any player i N ∈ rarely consumes the commodity if
The left-hand side of inequalities (2) and (6) represents the probability that the monetary transfer to player i is close to zero. Inequality (2) implies that it is almost certain that the monetary transfer to any seller {1,..., } i nr ∈ is close to zero if
> . Inequality (6) implies that it is almost certain that the monetary transfer to any buyer { 1,...,2 } i nr nr ∈ + is close to zero if
The left-hand side of inequality (3) Based on the above observations, the theorem states that when the number of players is sufficiently large, competitive allocations with complete information are virtually implementable in twice iterative dominance. Moreover, the theorem requires the used mechanisms to be detail-free, i.e., to be designed independent of the specifications of the environments.
The proof of this theorem is constructive; an outline of the proof is provided in the following section.
Outline of the Proof
The central planner divides the players into r distinct groups. Each group
which includes n sellers and n buyers. Consider the following six cases: For each {0,...,6} k ∈ , each seller i sells the commodity to buyer i nr + for p with a probability of 6 k if and only if any k cases among these six cases occur at once.
Price-Taking Rule:
The central planner calculates the market-clearing price ( ) [0,1]
, which is defined as the nth highest bid among the second bids announced in group β . Within each group β , the central planner sets the trading price for the group equal to the market-clearing price ( 1) p β − of its preceding group 1 β − . Every seller in each group β is compelled to sell the commodity to the central planner for ( 1) p β − . The central planner then sells these n units back to the players in the same group β whose third bids are greater than ( 1) p β − . If less than n players in group β make their third bids greater than ( 1) p β − , the central planner randomly selects and compels players to buy the unsold commodities. If more than n players make their third bids greater than ( 1) p β − , the central planner randomly selects and sells the commodities to n players among them.
Note that the above procedure is detail-free, i.e., it does not depend on the finer details of the specifications. Fix an environment e E ∈ arbitrarily. We show that each player's first bid reveals her private signal truthfully. Note that each player's first bid influences her payoff only through the random fixed price rule. Since the trading price p is randomly determined, each player i is willing to make the first bid 
denotes the probability of 0 ω occurring conditional on 
Full Proof of the Theorem
We model the three-stage procedure in Section 4 as a mechanism ( , , ) ( , , , , ) 
, :
:
Each player i simultaneously chooses a message With probability With probability x m corresponds to the expected monetary transfer from buyer nr i + to seller i . One interpretation is as follows. Every seller in each group β is compelled to sell the commodity to the central planner for ( 1) p β − . The central planner then sells these n units back to the players in the same group β whose third bids are greater than ( 1) p β − .
Price-Taking Rule
If the third bids of more than n players are bids greater than ( 1) p β − , the central planner randomly selects from among these players and sells the commodities to them. This corresponds to Case 1. If less than n players in group β make their third bids greater than or equal to ( 1) p β − , the central planner randomly selects from among the rest of the players and compels the selected players to buy the unsold commodities. This corresponds to Case 3. If less than n players make their third bids greater than ( 1) p β − and more than n players in group β make their third bids greater than or equal to ( 1) p β − , the central planner sells the commodities to the players who make their third bids greater than ( 1) completed the construction of the mechanism ( , , ) ( , , , , )
satisfies the properties of the theorem.
Twice Iterative Dominance
All the functions relevant to player ' i s utility are Hence, we have proved that for every i N ∈ , if i s is undominated, then it must hold that 
Competitive Allocations
Since the size 2n of each group is sufficiently large, it is almost certain from the law of large numbers and Assumptions 1 and 3 that 
